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Notes
Cultural Apocalypse Now: The Loss of the
Iraq Museum and a New Proposal for the
Wartime Protection of Museums
Kirstin E. Petersen*

INTRODUCTION
In April of 2003, the Iraq Museum in Baghdad was looted.1
Fifteen thousand pieces were stolen and lost to the illicit trade
in cultural artifacts. 2
A collaborative effort between
international customs agencies, cultural agencies, museum
professionals, and universities led to the recovery of thousands
of artifacts. 3 However, the repatriation efforts constituted a
questionable victory. The museum, as it was before the looting,
no longer exists. 4 To date, the recovered objects represent less
than fifty percent of the original collection. 5 Many objects were
also destroyed in the course of the looting.6 Items too large for
looters to transport were dismembered with chain saws and
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University, 2003. I would like to thank my family and friends for their support,
even though they will probably never read beyond this page.
1.

THE LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM, BAGHDAD: THE LOST LEGACY OF

ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA 1 (Milbry Polk & Angela M. H. Schuster eds., 2005)
[hereinafter LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM].
2. Id. at 1, 8.
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at9.
5. Id. at 2.

6. Id.
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sledgehammers. 7 During the United States' invasion that
served as a catalyst for the looting, the museum building itself
sustained severe structural damage but miraculously escaped
total destruction.8 The Iraq Museum was much more than a
repository of objects; it was a record of human progress. 9 It held
some of the greatest treasures from ancient Mesopotamia, the
birthplace of civilization. 10 The loss of the museum was
devastating, not just for Iraq, but for the entire world.
This Note explores international law regarding the
protection of museums during armed conflict. Part I will briefly
discuss the history of looting, the theft of cultural property, and
the development of international safeguards for museums. Part
II critiques post-World War II international responses to the
looting of museums by examining the recent case of the looting
of the Iraq Museum. This section also stresses the importance
of protecting museums in times of war, rather than waiting for
the dispersal of museum collections to occur before attempting
any action. This Note concludes that international safeguards
for cultural property have been ineffective in protecting
museums, argues that international law should cease to treat
museums as necessary casualties of war, and proposes ways to
provide greater protection to museums during times of armed
conflict.
I.

WARTIME LOOTING OF MUSEUMS AND TRADITIONAL
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

A.

TO THE VICTORS GO THE SPOILS: LOOTING

The theft or destruction of cultural artifacts during wartime
is a longstanding practice. 1 Nations have often waged wars
primarily for the purpose of pillaging. 12 There is no greater sign
7.
8.
9.

10.

Id. at8.
See id.
Id. at5.

Id.

11. Charles de Visscher, "International Protection of Works of Art and Historic
Monuments," U.S. Department of State, Documents and State Papers 821, 823 (June
1949).
12. Jeanette Greenfield, "The Spoils of War," in THE SPOILS OF WAR: WORLD
WAR

II

AND ITS AFTERMATH:

THE

Loss, REAPPEARANCE,

AND

RECOVERY OF

CULTURAL PROPERTY 34, 35 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE SPOILS
OF WAR] (describing the Crusades, which were ostensibly holy missions, but were
predominantly excuses to pillage the rich lands from Central Europe to Jerusalem).
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of crushing defeat than the loss of national treasures, while
bringing home the spoils of conquest shows complete victory. 13
Museums, as places where valuable cultural artifacts are stored4
for safekeeping, are a natural target for invaders and looters.'
It may seem preposterous to make the protection of museums a
priority in times of war, when human beings are dying and the
fates of nations hang in the balance. However, museum looting
is among the most long lasting and supremely devastating
effects of wartime destruction. 15 The true impact of looting is
not recognized until much too late. The protection of museums
in times of war may help to prevent cultural obliteration, lead to
better rebuilding after war, and preserve museum collections for
future generations. Such protection can also improve post-war
international relations, by allowing a war-torn populace to draw
strength and perspective from its own cultural history.
The history of museum looting in times of war begins with
the legendary destruction of the Great Library of Alexandria,
housed in a museum quite dissimilar from the modern
conception of a museum.' 6 The Great Library was the first
library of its kind, and the grandest library of the ancient
world.' 7 The Museum was predominantly a center for learning,
a place to serve the Muses.' 8 Unlike earlier temples dedicated
to the Muses, this Museum was dedicated to practicing the
Muses' arts and storing the resulting works.' 9 Members of the
Museum were accomplished poets, scholars, writers and
scientists.20 The members lived and worked together, with the
greatest works of the ancient world at their fingertips. 21 The
13.

Visscher, supra note 11, at 823.

14. CECIL GOULD, TROPHY OF CONQUEST: THE MUS9E NAPOL9ON AND THE
CREATION OF THE LOUVRE 13 (1965).

15. See LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM, supra note 1, at 5. The looting of the
Iraq Museum was not merely the loss of an Iraqi cultural institution; it was the loss
of a record of 10,000 years of civilization. In any case where a part of the human
experience is destroyed, the cost is global.
16. The meaning of the word "museum" has changed over time. The modem
definition of a museum is "[a]n institution for the acquisition, preservation, study,
and exhibition of works of artistic, historical, or scientific value." WEBSTER'S II NEW
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 722 (Margery S. Berube et al. eds., 1995). The Greek word
mouseion, from which the English word museum was derived, means "of the Muses."
Id.
17.
18.

LIONEL CASSON, LIBRARIES IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 31 (2001).
KONSTANTINOS SP. STAIKOS, THE GREAT LIBRARIES: FROM ANTIQUITY TO

THE RENAISSANCE (3000 B.C. TO 1600 A.D.) 62-63 (Timothy Cullen trans., 2000).
19. CASSON, supra note 17, at 33.
20. Id.
21.

MATTHEW BATTLES, LIBRARY: AN UNQUIET HISTORY 28-30 (2003).
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papyrus scrolls in the various buildings of the complex totaled
over 500,000.22
The famous fire that is rumored to have destroyed the
Museum and Library of Alexandria took place in 48 B.C. 23 That
year, Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon and became involved in
Cleopatra's war against her brother, Ptolemy XIII, for the
throne. 24 Outnumbered and cornered, Caesar burned the ships
in the harbor of Alexandria to forestall any attempt by Ptolemy
XIII to take back the city by sea. 25 The fire is supposed to have
26
spread to the city, destroying the Museum and the Library.
The Museum of Alexandria and other museums of the
ancient world were not repositories of cultural artifacts.2 7 Until
the birth of the modem museum, objects of value were stored
in-and looted from-temples, palaces, churches, and
monasteries. 28 During the Renaissance, the discovery of longburied classical artifacts in Rome fueled a desire for collection
and preservation previously unknown. 29
The treasures
unearthed by the wealthy and powerful were placed in private
30
collections that would eventually become the first museums.
These early collections were basically gatherings of assorted
artifacts maintained by prosperous individuals in private
residences. 31
Collection owners invited educated and
accomplished guests to view their pieces, but kept the contents
largely to themselves. 32 It was not until the late eighteenth
century that these private collections were transformed into
public museums. 33 So it was, that over time, the word museum
came to mean "a collection of objects of art, of monuments of
22. See CASSON, supra note 17, at 36. Some estimates place the number of
scrolls at over 700,000. STAIKOS, supra note 18, at 70.
23. CASSON, supra note 17, at 45. There is some dispute over the timing of the
destruction of the library. Id. Some scholars believe that Caesar caused only minor
damage to the library, and that it merely fell into disuse over the next few centuries.
Id. at 46. In this scenario, the library would have been destroyed along with much
of Alexandria during Emperor Aurelian's siege of the city in 270 A.D. Id.
24. Id. at 45-46.
25.
26.
27.

See BATLES, supra note 21, at 23-24.
See CASSON, supra note 17, at 46.
1 DAVID MURRAY, MUSEUMS: THEIR HISTORY AND THEIR USE 1 (Routledge/

Thoemmes Press 1996) (1904).
28. See Greenfield, supra note 12, at 35.
29.

MURRAY, supra note 27, at 13.

30. Id. at 13, 18.
31. See id. at 78-101.
32. See id. at 78-101.
33. GOULD, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing the conversion of royal collections
in Florence, Vienna and Stockholm into public museums).
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antiquity or of specimens of natural history, mineralogy, and the
of what were known as 'rarities' and
like, and generally
'curiosities." 34
In pre-Revolutionary France, as elsewhere, art and cultural
artifacts were almost entirely under the control of the Church
and the Crown. 35 During the revolution of 1789, French
revolutionaries seized these holdings, and made them the
property of the French people. 36 In 1793, the Louvre was opened
the best of French royal and
as a public museum, boasting
37
ecclesiastical art treasures.
Although the Louvre contained many beautiful works, the
French remained unsatisfied, and their subsequent European
campaigns became as much about cultural expropriation as
territorial expansion. 38 Only one year after the opening of the
Louvre, a shipment of stolen art arrived from Belgium and was
placed in the new museum. 39 The brutally systematic looting of
state
Belgium 40 established a procedure for looting a conquered
41
Wars.
Napoleonic
the
throughout
followed
be
would
that
The scrupulously planned Napoleonic invasions placed
great emphasis on the loot expected for each prospective
a
conquest. 42 A newly-formed military commission created 43
country.
given
a
in
found
be
might
that
artifacts
of
catalogue
Napoleon especially desired to conquer Italy, not for land, but
for its vast wealth of art and cultural artifacts." This aspiration
was not motivated by a love of art, only the desire to achieve
45
total French domination of the European continent.
Subjugation of Italy, the cultural center of Europe, could only be
complete once its treasured objects were removed to the
Louvre. 46 So began a new era of looting, in which conquering
nations emptied the museums of other countries to fill their
own.
Due to increasing concern over protecting cultural property
34.
35.

MURRAY, supra note 27, at 35-36.
GOULD, supra note 14, at 13.

36. Id.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Greenfield, supra note 12, at 35.
GOULD, supra note 14, at 30.
Visscher, supra note 11, at 824.
GOULD, supra note 14, at 41-43.
Id.

43. Id.
44. Id.
45.

Id. at 43.

46. Id.
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after the defeat of Napoleon, looting proved to be a minor issue
in the wars of the next century.47 For instance, the territorial
stalemate that occurred during World War I forestalled any
plans for extensive looting during that war. 48 However, despite
new protection of cultural artifacts, the Napoleonic looting
model would be extensively
and ruthlessly employed by the
49
Nazis during World War 11.
Unlike Napoleon, Hitler had a certain appreciation of art,
having been an unsuccessful artist himself.50 He was also very
aware of the power represented by cultural, as well as physical,
domination. After visiting Paris for the first time in 1940,
Hitler remarked, "Wasn't Paris beautiful? . . .Berlin must be
made far more beautiful. . . In the past I often considered
whether we would not have to destroy Paris. But when we are
finished in Berlin, Paris will be but a shadow." 51 To fulfill
Hitler's destructive and egomaniacal dream, the Nazis seized
treasures from across Europe. 52 Since the Nazi army had a
policy against looting, separate branches of government evolved
to manage Nazi looting procedures. 53 Hitler established the
Einsatzstab Richsleiter Rosenberg 54 and the Dienststelle
Muhlmann 5 for the sole purpose of confiscating art to glorify
the Third Reich.56 In the Napoleonic tradition of systematically
plundering conquered cities, the Nazi seizure of art and artifacts
took place with an efficiency and thoroughness previously
57
unseen.
The Nazi cultural program had two facets: confiscation and
47.

JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL

ARTS 25 (Kluwer Law Int'l 1998) (1979).
48. See GARY JONATHON BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS
OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 82-83 (2000). As in most wars, there was some looting.
Id. At the beginning of World War I, the French seized art from German nationals
living in France. HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO
STEAL THE WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 28 (BasicBooks 1997) (1995). German
troops also sacked a few French towns. BASS, at 88. However, such relatively minor
looting activity is outside the scope of this article.
49. See generally FELICIANO, supra note 48, at 24-30.
50. Id. at 17-18.
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id. at 16.
53. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 26-27.
54.

DURING
2004).
55.
56.
57.

GERARD AALDERS, NAZI LOOTING: THE PLUNDER OF THE DUTCH JEWRY

THE SECOND WORLD WAR 43 (Arnold Pomerans & Erica Pomerans trans.,
Id.
Id. at 45.
See FELICIANO, supra note 48, at 15.
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destruction. 58
Nazis emptied Western European museums,
designating seized art the property of the Third Reich. 59 Hitler
planned to house some of these works in a never-realized Nazi
museum of art, while others entered the private collections of
high-ranking Nazis, and still more disappeared on the black
market. 60
Jewish and Eastern European cultural artifacts
suffered a different, irreversible fate.6 1 Beginning in Germany,
art owned by Jewish families or created by Jewish artists was
seized, sold, or generally destroyed. 62
During the ensuing
occupations, "substandard" works of art produced by "inferior"
Eastern Europeans were to be eradicated along with the people
themselves, their culture, and their language. 63 In all, the Nazis
64
destroyed over one-half million objects.
Since the days of antiquity, looting has been a commonplace
facet of war. 65 It has been used as a method of compensating
soldiers, 66 and as a way to demonstrate victory. 67 Roman law
considered cultural artifacts res nullius during war. 68 Although
the Nazi plunder of Europe was essentially conducted in this
Roman tradition, the conception that art becomes ownerless
during war has changed over the centuries. 69 The next section
will discuss these developments for the protection of cultural
artifacts.
B.

TO THE CONQUERED RETURN THE SPOILS: REPATRIATION

The tradition of looting is as old as war.7 0 However, as long
as artwork and antiquities have been pillaged, there has been
considerable unease about the practice.7 1 Over time, antilooting sentiments became the foundations for international law
regarding the protection of cultural artifacts.
Perhaps the earliest condemnation of looting practices, and

58.
59.
60.
61.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 26.
FELICIANO, supra note 48, at 16.
Greenfield, supra note 12, at 38.
AALDERS, supra note 54, at 11.

66.

Id.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

GOULD, supra note 14, at 43.
AALDERS, supra note 54, at 11.

62.

Greenfield, supra note 12, at 38.
GOULD, supra note 14, at 13.
Visscher, supra note 11, at 823.
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the first attempt to differentiate cultural artifacts from other
riches, may be found in the writings of the Greek historian
Polybius.7 2 After the Roman conquest of Greece, Polybius wrote:
One may perhaps have some reason for amassing gold and silver; in
fact, it would be impossible to attain universal dominion without
appropriating these resources from other peoples, in order to weaken
them. In the case of every other form of wealth, however, it is more
glorious to leave it where it was, together with the envy which it
inspired, and to base our country's glory, not on the abundance and
beauty of its paintings and statues but on its sober customs and noble
sentiments. Moreover, I hope that future conquerors will learn from
these thoughts not to plunder the cities subjugated by them, and not to
make the
misfortunes of other peoples the adornments of their own
73
country.

Despite this moving protest, no legal protection for cultural
artifacts existed for many centuries thereafter. 74 The Roman
tradition of parading the cultural spoils of war denigrated by
Polybius was revived in the Renaissance, along with the interest
in all things ancient. 75 The looting of cultural artifacts during
wartime was, for all practical purposes, a perfectly acceptable
76
part of customary international law in that era.
During the eighteenth century, a new theory of war
eliminated plunder as a secondary military objective. 77 This
was not due to any new legal protections for cultural artifacts,
but rather due to an increased concentration on destroying an
enemy's military capabilities. 78 However, by the nineteenth
79
century, widespread concern about looting reemerged,
primarily as a result of the Napoleonic Wars and the concurrent
French cultural conquest of Europe.8 0 In opposition to the
French looting policies, Quatrembre de Quincy argued
eloquently for a universal republic of arts and sciences:
[T]he concern of all parts in the preservation of the whole . . . is a
concern for civilization, for perfecting the means of attaining happiness
and pleasure, for the advancement and progress of education and
reason: in a word, for the improvement of the human race. Everything

72.
73.
at 823.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
POLYBIUs, THE HISTORIES (n.p. n.d.), reprintedin Visscher, supra note 11,
Visscher, supra note 11, at 823.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 824.
See id.

79.

MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 25.

80.

See Greenfield, supra note 12, at 35.
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that can help toward this end belongs to all peoples; no one of them
81
has the right to appropriate it for itself, or to dispose of it arbitrarily.

Quatrem~re de Quincy's idealist view did not stop French
plunder of Europe. However, he and likeminded critics forced
82
the French government to invent a rationale for the looting.
As a result, French looting procedures became a blend 8of3
ancient barbarism and modern international law practices.
Often, artifacts were stolen incident to occupation, without
further justification.84
With increasing criticism of such
behavior, the French conquerors sought to legitimize the
seizures.85 They lamented deterioration of great works of art in
other countries, claiming only the superior French restorers
could save them.86 Of course, rather than being returned to
their original museums, these "restored" works of art
permanently became a part of the Louvre collection.8 7 The
French also justified the seizures using more formal legal
means.88 For example, occasionally they used reparations as a
justification to confiscate artwork.8 9 In Italy, the French
experienced the strongest resistance to the removal of cultural
artifacts, leading them to obtain title to the pieces in formal
post-invasion peace treaties. 90
Immediately after Napoleon's first defeat and abdication in
1814, the former owners of plundered artifacts sought the
return of their property.91 A convoy containing pictures seized
from Spain was halted just over the French border. 92 Pope Pius
VII was able to negotiate the restoration of his archives and
papers. 93 After Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo in 1815,
however, negotiations ceased. 94
The Congress of Vienna
81. Lettres au g~n6ral Miranda sur le prejudice qu'occasioneraient aux arts et
h la science le d~placement des monuments de l'art de l'Italie, le d6membrement de
ses 9coles et la spoliation de ses collections galeries, mus~es, etc., 1796, reprinted in
Visscher, supra note 11, at 824.
82. See GOULD, supra note 14, at 67-68.
83. See Visscher, supra note 11, at 824-25.
84.

See id. at 824.

85.
86.

See id. at 824-25.
GOULD, supra note 14, at 68.

87.

See id.

88.

See Visscher, supra note 11, at 824-25.

89.

Id. at 825.

90.

Id. at 824-25.

91. See Dorothy Mackay Quynn, The Art Confiscations of the Napoleonic Wars,
50 AM. HIST. REV. 437, 445 (1945).

92.
93.
94.

Id. at 443.
Id. at 446.
See GOULD, supra note 14, at 117.
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mandated the return of many more of the treasures. 95 It was
the first attempt by conquered peoples to reclaim stolen objects
and the first international attempt to repatriate cultural
96
artifacts.
The French, meanwhile, saw the repatriations as illegal
seizures. 97 They pointed to treaties made with conquered states,
claiming the artifacts had been legally acquired. 98 The Allies
categorically refused to honor the purported transfers of title,
believing such transfers were made under duress. 99 For the first
time, both conqueror and conquered appealed to international
legal norms to justify both looting and repatriation. 10 0
Unfortunately, returning everything was not that simple. 10
Not all of the artifacts survived the long and hazardous journey
to France, let alone the return trip. 0 2 The director-general of
the Louvre challenged every claim of previous ownership, and as
03
a result, many of the plundered artifacts remained in France.
Some of the artwork was sold, and the new owners refused to
give up their possessions. 0 4 For example, Tsar Alexander I
purchased a great deal of the looted artwork from France, and
refused to participate in the repatriation efforts. 10 5
Since
attempts to restore plundered
artifacts were largely
unsuccessful, the international community began to reconsider

the role of pillaging in times of war.
The devastating effect of museum looting on cultural
identity during the Napoleonic Wars marked the beginning of
increasing international concern over the possible illegality of

95. See Greenfield, supra note 12, at 35-36.
96. See Visscher, supra note 11, at 826.
97. See Quynn, supra note 91, at 459.
98. Id.
99. See Visscher, supra note 11, at 826.
100. See id. at 825-26.
101. See GOULD, supra note 14, at 62.
102. See id. ("The transport of huge quantities of fragile, infinitely precious and
in some cases very large and heavy objects away from the climatic conditions to
which they had grown accustomed, under the noses of a hostile populace, exposed to
extremities of heat, cold and damp, over primitive roads at the mercy of brigands, or
seas controlled by corsairs or the British navy, in some cases over the Alps-this
would have constituted a challenge worthy of the organizing powers of Bonaparte
himself and of the devoted resourcefulness of his staff. Anyone with experience of
moving works of art might well consider it criminal lunacy to even make the
attempt.")
103. Id. at 118, 128.
104. See Quynn, supra note 91, at 459-60.
105. See id.
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looting.10 6 Reparation efforts after the wars became the basis
for a "very general principle of the integrity of the artistic
heritage of conquered nations." 10 7 Under this rubric, even
theoretically legal means of acquisition, such as treaties made
during occupation, were considered unlawful. 0 8
During the rest of the nineteenth century, countries further
developed this new legal condemnation of looting. 0 9 In 1863,
President Lincoln promulgated Instructions for the Government
of Armies of the United States in the Field, also known as the
Lieber Code." 0 Article 35 stated "Classical works of art . . .
must be secured against all avoidable injury, even when they
are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or
bombarded.""'
These ideas spread to Europe, where the
wartime protection of cultural artifacts became a customary rule
112
of international law.
The first attempt to create an international agreement on
the protection of museums and cultural artifacts was the 1874
Declaration of Brussels, organized by Russia and involving a
total of fifteen states." 3 One part of the declaration stated:
The property of parishes (communes), or establishments devoted to
religion, charity, education, arts and sciences, although belonging to
the State, shall be treated as private property. Every seizure,
destruction of, or willful damage to, such establishments, historical
monuments, or works11of
art or of science, should be prosecuted by
4
competent authorities.

However, Great Britain resisted and the multilateral
convention never became binding on the parties. 115 In 1880, the
Institute of International Law created the Manual of the Laws
106.

See MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 25.

107.

Visscher, supra note 11, at 826.

108.

See id.

109. See id. at 827.
110. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by
President Lincoln, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter The Lieber Code], reprinted in THE
SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 12, at 272-73.

111. Id. art. 35.
112. See Visscher, supra note 11, at 827. ("From the sixteenth century on, the
claims of pillaged cities and countries became numerous: coinciding with the
awakening of national feeling, those claims attest the depth of their resentment.
During the nineteenth century, the doctrine of international law was accepted by
all.")
113.
114.

MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 25.
Declaration of Brussels art. 8, 1874, reprinted in MERRYMAN & ELSEN,

supra note 47, at 25.
115.

MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 25.
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and Customs of War. 116 The manual affirmed that institutions
devoted to the arts and sciences could not be seized, and
emphasized that causing damage to these institutions was
forbidden, except when militarily necessitated." 7
Between 1899 and 1907, similar protections of museums
and cultural artifacts were integrated into binding international
agreements in a series of conventions that took place in The
Hague." 18 The fourth of these conventions established that
"seizure [or] destruction or willful damage" to cultural
institutions or artifacts "is forbidden, and should be made the
subject of legal proceedings." 1 9 So, by the start of the twentieth
century, looting was condemned throughout the20 West and
prohibited by international rules on the law of war.
These developments led to a new kind of restitution process
in the aftermath of World War 1.121 In the Treaties of Versailles
and Saint-Germaine, the Triple Entente mandated the return of
cultural artifacts from the Central Powers. 122 Surprisingly, the
objects sought to be returned had not been stolen in the course
of this war. 23 They were objects previously acquired by Central
Power states and now returned to their countries of origin as
reparations for losing this war. 24 Even more incredibly, these
returned artifacts had not necessarily been seized illegally by
Germany and its allies in past wars or invasions. 25 Rather,
some of the returned objects had been acquired by these states
through entirely legal means, such as a direct sale. 26 These
reparations even more firmly solidified the international
condemnation of looting during wartime and affirmed the

The agreements included a Convention on Pacific Settlement of
116. Id.
International Disputes, an 1899 Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land,
and a 1907 Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land. Id. at 25-26.

117. Institute of International Law Manual of the Laws and Customs of War art.
53, 1880, reprintedin MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 25-26.
118.
119.

MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 26.
Hague IV, 1907, reprinted in MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 26.

120. See Visscher, supra note 11, at 829.
121. See id. at 827.
122. Id. at 829.
123. Id.
124. See id. Germany was forced to return certain historical artifacts and works
of art seized from France during the war of 1870-1871. Treaty of Peace with
Germany art. 245, June 28, 1919, T.S. 658 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
125. Visscher, supra note 11, at 829.
126. Id. Germany also had to restore the original Koran of the Caliph Othman
to the King of the Hedjaz, which had been presented to Wilhelm II by Turkish
authorities. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 124, art. 246.
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importance of the unity of museum collections. 127 Artifacts were
seen as remaining tied to a specific culture
regardless of how
128
long they were kept in another country.
The Nazis were especially attuned to this idea. 29 In the
infamous KUmmel report, the Nazis claimed title to every piece
of artwork that ever had any connection with Germany. 30 As if
in answer to Napoleon, Hitler demanded the return of all
cultural artifacts that had been removed beyond German
31
borders, whether by looters or by sale.'
For the most part, however, the Nazis looted museums in
country after country, without any attempt to justify their
actions by couching their pillaging in legal terms. 32 They
reverted to an ancient form of looting, seizing artifacts as an
incidental part of conquest. 133 Nazi pillaging was particularly
atrocious when considered against the movement towards
developing international law safeguards for cultural artifacts in
the nineteenth century. 34 By the end of World War II, the
cultural treasures of Europe had been scattered and destroyed,
and the international legal community was faced with serious
35
problems regarding restitution and reparation.
Initial restitution efforts were far from successful. 36 One
serious problem was the number of pillaged pieces, since
millions of cultural artifacts had been forcibly relocated during
the war. 37 In some cases, there was nothing to return, as
hundreds of thousands of cultural artifacts were also

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Visscher, supra note 11, at 828.
See id.
See generally FELICIANO, supra note 48, at 24-30.
See id. at 24-26.
See id. at 26-29.
See Visscher, supra note 11, at 828.
KENNETH D. ALFORD, THE SPOILS OF WORLD WAR II: THE AMERICAN

MILITARY'S ROLE IN STEALING EUROPE'S TREASURES 278 (1994).

134.
135.
136.

See Greenfield, supra note 12, at 38.
See MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 47, at 26-27.
See Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford, Introduction, in HOLOCAUST

RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 1, 2-3 (Michael J.

Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 1997) [hereinafter HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION].
("With hundreds of thousands of pieces of art confiscated by the Nazis during the
war, the Allies' approach was one of repatriation to the country of origin, with each
government responsible for the ultimate return of the art to the rightful owners.
Not surprisingly, many governments did not rigorously pursue this objective,
leaving thousands of pieces of looted art subject to claims for restitution by their
previous owners.")
137. See LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE'S
TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 407 (1994).
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destroyed. 138 Furthermore, given the unfathomable proportions
of the Holocaust, there were often no owners to whom the
specific pieces could be returned. 139 To make the situation even
more complicated, during the post-war occupation American and
Russian soldiers became just as adept at looting as the
Germans. 140 Following the Nazi example, the conquering Allies
invaded German museums and stole cultural artifacts.1 4 ' For
that reason, Allied forces were not entirely interested in
promoting the general return of cultural artifacts, preferring to
keep the artifacts in their own museums. 42 Many items remain
missing, so restitution efforts continue to this day.143
In fact, it is only in the past few decades that the Holocaust
restitution movement has really gained momentum.' 44 Unlike
other foci of the movement, 45 the restitution of looted art has
occurred slowly, one piece at a time.1 46 The first part of the
process, locating the piece of art, has been aided with the advent
of computers and the Internet. 47 There are also entities, such
as the New York State Banking Department's Holocaust Claims
Processing Office, which specialize in recovering art stolen from
Holocaust victims.' 48 However, even after survivors or their
heirs locate a specific piece of lost art in a museum or private
49
collection, there is a great deal of time and expense involved.
Each claim must be investigated thoroughly to secure the proper
documentation and establish the Holocaust-era provenance of
138. Greenfield, supra note 12, at 38.
139. See Monica S. Dugot, The Holocaust Claims Processing Office: New York
State's Approach to Resolving Holocaust-Era Art Claims, in HOLOCAUST
RESTITUTION, supra note 136, at 271-72. The heirs of Holocaust victims have been
the primary beneficiaries of the recent Holocaust restitution movement. See id.
140. Id.

141. Id.
142. ALFORD, supra note 133, at xi.
143. NICHOLAS, supra note 137, at 443.
144. See Bazyler & Alford, supra note 136, at 2-3.
Holocaust survivors over $50 billion in 1952, some considered
Id. This view failed to take into account the looted art,
accounts, confiscated insurance policies, and many other

After Germany paid
restitution completed.
dormant Swiss bank
aspects of Holocaust

restitution. Id.
145. See id. at 3-4. There have been major settlements for Holocaust survivors
and their heirs in insurance, banking, and slave labor litigation. Id.
146. Dugot, supra note 139, at 273. ("Given that each art claim involves a
specific and identifiable object, art claims have been resolved on a case-by-case

basis.")
147. See, e.g., The Art Loss Register, http://www.artloss.com (last visited Sept.
23, 2006). The Register traces art looted by the Nazis. See id.
148. See Dugot, supra note 139, at 272.
149. See id. at 272-73.
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the artifact. 150
Then follows an extended negotiation or
litigation period, after which, if the claim is valid and
compelling, the object might be returned. 151 Needless to say, the
Holocaust art restitution process is a difficult one, and no
matter how many items are restored, it will never be a complete
success.
After the Second World War, the international community
began to develop a new framework for the protection of cultural
artifacts, which remains in force today.
These major
international legal protections for museums in times of war
were developed by the United Nations152 Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

The first post-war attempt to safeguard cultural artifacts
was the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954 (Hague
Convention). 15 3 Museums are included within the definition of
cultural property to be protected under the Hague
Convention.154 The contracting parties
undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own
territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting
Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate
surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes
which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of
armed conflict; and by55refraining from any act of hostility directed
against such property.1

The parties must also thwart attempts to loot cultural
property.156 However, obligations to protect cultural property
are considered waived in cases of military necessity. 157 The first
Protocol to the Hague Convention deals predominantly with the
restitution and recovery of cultural artifacts. 158 A second
150.
151.

Id. at 273-74.
Id. at 274-76.

152. Lyndel V. Prott, Principles for the Resolution of Disputes Concerning
CulturalHeritage DisplacedDuring the Second World War, in THE SPOILS OF WAR,

supra note 12, at 227.
153. UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict, opened for signature May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter

Hague Convention].
154. Id. art. 1(b) ("buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or
exhibit... movable cultural property...
155. Id. art. 4(1).
156. Id. art. 4(3).
157. Id. art. 4(2).
158. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, opened for signature May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358

[hereinafter Protocol to the Hague Convention].
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Protocol reaffirms and refines the principles discussed in the
Hague Convention. 159
Two other recent conventions also address the problem of
stolen cultural artifacts.
In 1970, UNESCO adopted the
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property (UNESCO 1970).160 UNESCO 1970 does not deal
directly with the problems of wartime protection of museums. 161
As the title of the Convention suggests, the emphasis is on
returning artifacts, rather than on preventing their initial
seizure. However, the Convention does affirm that "[tihe export
and transfer of ownership of cultural property under compulsion
arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a country by
a foreign power shall be regarded as illicit."162 The UNIDROIT
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of
1995 (UNIDROIT Convention) further supplemented the
UNESCO conventions by providing basic legal rules for the
restitution and return of stolen artifacts. 163 However, the
UNIDROIT Convention contains no discussion of wartime
seizures.
From the content of these documents, it appears that the
main concern of the international community is the restitution
of illegally seized cultural artifacts. Although the Hague
Convention purports to create protections for cultural property,
the Protocol to the Hague Convention only discusses
repatriation. 16 4
The other conventions are almost entirely
focused on the return of stolen items.
After World War II, the international legal community
soundly condemned the practice of looting in times of war and
created a general prohibition against looting by invading
powers. More recently, museum looting in times of war or
during armed conflict has not been as systematic as that which
occurred during the Napoleonic Wars and World War II. Recent
159. Second Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, opened for signature Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769
[hereinafter Second Protocol to the Hague Convention].
160. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, opened for
signature Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO 1970].
161. Prott, supra note 152, at 227.
162. UNESCO 1970, supra note 160, art. 11.
163. UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects,
opened for signature June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Convention].
164. Prott, supra note 152, at 225, 227.
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condemnations of artifact theft do not adequately protect
museums from looting by non-invaders during war. The failure
of these international safeguards in the case of the Iraq
Museum, as well as a possible remedy for the recurring tragedy
of wartime devastation of museums, will be discussed in the
following section.
II. THE FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS
FOR MUSEUMS
A. THE LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM
Looking at the case of the Iraq Museum, it might appear
that the looting was an inevitable consequence of an invasion,
and that the repatriation efforts were very successful *underthe
circumstances.
After all, war is war, and casualties are
inevitable. When lives are being lost, cultural artifacts are not
of paramount importance. This view might be more persuasive
if the looting had occurred in another century, or with less
technologically-developed state actors. However, in this age of
scrupulously organized invasions, precision bombing, and
military planners, there was no reason that the Iraq Museum
could not have been protected. The looting of the Iraq Museum
in April of 2003 constituted a failure of supposed international
legal protections for cultural artifacts.
The Hague Convention and its Protocols, the major
international instruments for the safeguarding of cultural
artifacts, provided woefully inadequate protections for the Iraq
Museum. First, the Hague Convention can have little efficacy
when it is not accepted by many countries throughout the
world. 165 Second, a military necessity exception for protection of
cultural artifacts further weakens the protections granted by
the convention. 166 Third, the convention relies too much on the
countries involved to protect their own cultural property.167
Fourth, the international legal community offers little effective
assistance. 168 Finally, the Hague Convention and the UNESCO
conventions focus too heavily on repatriation and the recovery of

165. See infra notes 170-179 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. See infra notes 183-192 and
accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 193-206 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 207-213 and accompanying text.
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Rather, the focus should be on the prevention of

The (Not Entirely International)InternationalProtections

The first main problem with the Hague Convention, as with
most multilateral agreements, is the fact that a limited number
of states have ratified it.1 70 Fewer still are party to the two
Protocols to the Hague Convention. 171 The United States has
ratified neither the Convention nor the protocols. On the other
hand, Iraq ratified both the Hague Convention and the first
Protocol in 1967.172

The Hague Convention offers guidance for such situations,
in which only one of the parties to an armed conflict has ratified
the Convention. It states that:
If one of the Powers in conflict is not a Party to the present
Convention, the Powers which are Parties thereto shall nevertheless
remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore
be bound by the Convention, in relation to the said Power, if the latter
has declared that it accepts the provisions thereof and so long as it
17 3
applies them.

Therefore, Iraq was required to protect its cultural property

during and after the United States invasion. The United States
was not.
When the United States invaded and attempted to take
over in April 2003, there was no Iraqi government left to follow
the Hague Convention and protect cultural artifacts. The U.S.
military did very little to protect the museum.

The Iraq

Museum was put on the military's no-target list, meaning only
that it would not be bombed. 174 After the looting began on the
169. See infra notes 215-227 and accompanying text.
170. There are currently 115 state parties to the Hague Convention. List of
parties
to
the
Hague
Convention,
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E (last visited Nov.
20, 2005).
171. There are currently ninety-three state parties to the Protocol to the Hague
Convention.
List of parties to the Protocol of the Hague Convention,
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=15391&language=E (last visited Nov.
20, 2005). There are forty-one state parties to the Second Protocol to the Hague
convention. List of parties to the Second Protocol of the Hague Convention,
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=15207&language=E (last visited Nov.
20, 2005).
172. THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 12, at 296.
173. Hague Convention, supra note 153, art. 18(3).
174. Douglas Jehl and Elizabeth Becker, Experts' Pleas to PentagonDidn't Save
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afternoon of April 10, a Thursday, one museum official ran
through Baghdad looking for American soldiers to put a stop to
the plunder. 175 A tank manned by five marines returned to the
museum with him, fired a few shots, and the crowd of several
thousand looters scattered. 176 When the tank left after thirty
minutes, however, the crowd returned. 177 Although the military
promised to patrol the museum starting on Sunday, the
museum had been decimated by Friday night. 178 It took only
forty-eight hours for looters to strip the museum of thousands of
artifacts. 179
The Hague Convention cannot be considered an effective
protection for cultural artifacts in armed conflicts that involve
non-party states. 8 0 If a non-party invades a Convention party,
there is still no protection for the invaded country's artifacts. As
a result, the fact that powerful nations like the United States
and the United Kingdom have not ratified the Hague
Convention is concerning.
Even though the protection of
museums may have become something of a customary rule of
international law,' 8 ' the case of the Iraq Museum is evidence
that non-parties will not offer protections for cultural
institutions of their own accord.
2.

The Convenient Fiction of Military Necessity

Another problem regarding the Hague Convention is the
waiver of protections for cultural spaces in cases of military
necessity.182
Although some form of a military necessity
exception has existed since the Lieber Code, 8 3 the military
exception has allowed countries to justify unneeded destruction
of cultural property in a supposedly incontrovertible manner.
The Hague Convention states that the obligations to protect
cultural artifacts "may be waived only in cases where military
Museum, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at B5.
175. John F. Bums, PillagersStrip Iraqi Museum of Its Treasure, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2003, at Al.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
183. The Lieber Code, supra note 110, art. 38. ("Private property, unless
forfeited by crimes or by offenses of the owner, can be seized only by way of military
necessity, for the support or other benefit of the army or of the United States.")
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necessity imperatively requires such a waiver."18 4 However, the
Convention does not go on to explain what might constitute a
"military necessity."
The United States initially refused to ratify the Hague
Convention because the original draft did not contain a military
necessity exception. 8 5 Other governments argued that the
military necessity clause was inconsistent with the aspirations
of the Convention. 8 6 Even though the clause was ultimately
added, the United States still refused to become a party to the
Hague Convention. 8 7 Nevertheless, the United States justified
its failure to safeguard the Iraq Museum on military necessity
grounds. 188 General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, explained that combat operations were more
important than protecting the museum. 8 9 Other military
personnel claimed that there were not enough troops to attend
to the looting. 90 Although these excuses seem to indicate that
the United States was ignorant of the possibility of looting,
groups of art experts and scholars repeatedly warned the U.S.
government about the probability of looting in the months
before the invasion.' 9' Furthermore, the military was reminded
of the recent experience of the first Gulf War, in which nine
regional museums in Iraq were demolished by looters. 92
The Hague Convention legitimizes the myth of military
necessity in the protection of cultural property. This exception
is really an excuse for the destruction of cultural property when
it is militarily convenient, or when it is supposedly militarily
inconvenient to protect cultural property. In the time when it
was technologically difficult to limit wartime destruction,
military necessity could excuse accidentally bombing a museum
situated near a military base. Today, the United States
incorrectly believes that the claim of insufficient troops to guard
a museum constitutes military necessity, even though the
failure to provide troops is more likely due to the inconvenience
of protecting the museum than any military necessity. In this
184. Hague Convention, supra note 153, art. 4(2).
185. John Henry Merryman, Cultural Property Internationalism, 12 INT'L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 11, 20 (2005).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Jehl and Becker, supra note 174.

189.

Id.

190.
191.

Burns, supra note 175.
Jehl and Becker, supra note 174.

192.

LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM, supra note 1, at 1.
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era when invasions are scrupulously planned, there is no reason
museums cannot be immediately secured against destruction,
whether by bombing or looting.
3.

Over-relianceon NationalAction

The Hague Convention places a great deal of emphasis on
the ability of a party to respond to threats against its cultural
property. In many cases, this may be an undue burden on the
resources of a country, especially one preparing for armed
conflict.
Under the Hague Convention, protection of cultural
The
artifacts is to begin before the start of hostilities.
Convention states that "Parties undertake to prepare in time of
peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated within
their own territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed
conflict, by taking such measures as they consider
appropriate." 193 Once armed conflict has begun, the party is
charged to conduct its military operations in such a way as to
ensure the safety of cultural property.194 If cultural artifacts are
urgently threatened, they must be removed. 95
As discussed previously, there was no Iraqi government to
protect the Iraq Museum once the looting commenced, and the
U.S. military proved disobliging. 96 The only force remaining
between the Iraq Museum and the hordes of looters was its
staff. Museum workers desperately tried to protect the museum
197
from pillaging in the days before the United States' invasion.
They holed up in the museum, trying to protect what they
could. 198 Some easily transportable artifacts were sent to safety

193. Hague Convention, supra note 153, art. 3. The Second Protocol to the
Hague Convention explains that these measures "shall include, as appropriate, the
preparation of inventories, the planning of emergency measures for protection
against fire or structural collapse, the preparation for the removal of movable
cultural property or the provision for adequate in situ protection of such property,
and the designation of competent authorities responsible for the safeguarding of
cultural property." Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 159, art. 5.
However, this Protocol has not been ratified by Iraq, and so it will not be discussed
here.
194. See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
195. Hague Convention, supra note 153, arts. 12-13.
196. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
197. John Noble Wilford, Art Experts Fear Worst In the Plunder Of a Museum,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, at B3 [hereinafter Art Experts].
198. Id.
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elsewhere. 199 The museum workers unsuccessfully attempted to
protect more fragile artifacts with sandbags. 0 0 Finally, some of
the most valuable pieces were placed in the underground vaults
of the museums.2 1 Except for the successful removal of some
pieces from the museum, these safeguards were for naught. The
few remaining museum officials were no match for the
202
thousands of looters armed with guns, knives, axes, and clubs.
The museum was completely ransacked, and the steel doors of
20 3
the underground vaults were blown away.
When a country is preparing for armed conflict, especially
against a more powerful state, cultural artifacts are not a
priority. This leaves the duty of protecting the cultural artifacts
to an ill-equipped museum staff20 4 incapable of repelling droves
of armed looters. 20 5 In addition, museums lack the capability
and necessary funds to safely transport all artifacts, which are
20 6
often fragile and unwieldy, out of harm's way.
4.

The Impotent InternationalOrganization

In contrast to the great weight placed on national action by
the Hague Convention, relatively little is expected of
international organizations.
The ineffectiveness of the
international legal community is apparent here, as in many
multilateral conventions, since there is no police power to deal
with noncompliance. Where the issue is not noncompliance, but
actual non-recognition of the Hague Convention, international
organizations play an even smaller role.
The Hague Convention does not leave much room for
UNESCO in the protection of cultural artifacts. The parties:
may call upon the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization for technical assistance in organizing the protection of
their cultural property, or in connexion with any other problem arising
out to the application of the present Convention or the Regulations for
its execution. The Organization shall accord such assistance
within
20 7
the limits fixed by its programme and by its resources.

204.
205.

LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM, supra note 1, at 8.
Art Experts, supra note 197.
LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM, supra note 1, at 8.
Burns, supra note 175.
LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM, supra note 1, at 8.
See id.
Id.

206.

Id.

207.

Hague Convention, supra note 153, art. 23(1).

199.

200.
201.
202.

203.
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UNESCO is therefore not compelled to act in order to
protect cultural artifacts. Rather, it is given the option of
responding to requests from parties, if the circumstances prove
favorable.
Before the United States' invasion of Iraq, the United
Nations made no plans to protect cultural artifacts. When the
looting began, the United Nations still took no action. Even
after the Iraq Museum had been, for all practical purposes,
destroyed, the United Nations did nothing. Any and all
initiatives to protect the Iraq Museum were developed by art
experts and scholars. 208 In the months before the United States'
invasion, experts insisted that effective safeguards be created
for the museum. 20 9 After the looting, a group of over 230
scholars from twenty-five countries delivered a petition to the
United Nations that called for the protection of the Iraqi
artifacts. 210 International museum leaders also suggested a
moratorium on the purchase of antiquities from Iraq and
proposed amnesty for anyone returning a piece to the
museum. 211 A group of thirty experts also sent a mission to Iraq
to assess the extent of the losses and begin repatriation
efforts. 212 After all of these efforts by concerned individuals, the
trade in Iraqi
United Nations began working to halt illicit
213
artifacts and to find some of the looted pieces.
If international agreements for the protection of cultural
artifacts are to be at all effective, there must be an actual means
of ensuring the safety of the property, beyond the limited
resources of national governments in armed conflicts. When it
becomes clear that neither state involved in armed conflict is
willing or able to create adequate safeguards for cultural
artifacts, the international community must take responsibility
for keeping the property safe.
5.

The Inefficiency and Ineffectiveness of Repatriation

While the Hague Convention is focused on protecting
cultural artifacts during armed conflict, the Protocol to the
208.

Jehl and Becker, supra note 174.

209.

Id.

210. Art Experts, supra note 197.
211. John Noble Wilford, Curators Appeal for a Ban On Purchase of Iraqi
Artifacts, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2003, at B5 [hereinafter CuratorsAppeal].
212. Alan Riding, Art Experts Mobilize Team to Recover Stolen Treasure and
Salvage Iraqi Museums, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 2003, at B2.

213. Id.

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW

[Vol. 16:1

Convention and other U.N. conventions deal with the return of
artifacts after they have been looted or with controls on
exportation of stolen cultural property. 214 Postponing concern
about cultural artifacts until after a war is over does not account
for the incredible amount of damage and loss that may occur in
the interim.
The Protocol to the Hague Convention requires an
occupying party to prevent the exportation of cultural artifacts
from an occupied land. 215 It also provides that, at the end of
hostilities, an occupying nation must return all cultural
artifacts belonging to the occupied country; cultural property
may not be kept as war reparations. 216 UNESCO 1970 starts
from the proposition that "it is incumbent upon every State to
protect the cultural property existing within its territory against
the dangers of theft, clandestine excavation, and illicit
export." 217 The Convention then discusses in detail the ways to
prevent illicit transfer of cultural artifacts and the means of
effecting the return of illegally exported pieces. 218
The
UNIDROIT Convention simply states that "the possessor of a
cultural object which has been stolen shall return it."219 The
rest of the Convention describes an elaborate protocol for
restitution of stolen cultural artifacts and return of illegally
exported cultural objects. 220 The main focus of these agreements
is returning cultural artifacts to their country of origin, not
preventing the circumstances which necessitated the return in
the first place.
There are several reasons why restitution efforts have been
generally lamentable in the case of the Iraq Museum. While
several thousand artifacts have already been recovered, and no
doubt more will be returned as the years go on, many thousands
more may never be found. 221 Since professional thieves were
responsible for a great deal of the looting, many of the most
valuable pieces-both historically and monetarily-are probably
well-hidden in private collections. 222 Due to a lack of a complete
museum inventory, it is also impossible to know exactly what
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra notes 153-164 and accompanying text.
Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 158, § 1(1).
Id. § 1(3).
UNESCO 1970, supra note 160, para. 5.
Id. arts. 5-14.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 163, art. 3(1).
Id. arts. 3-7.
LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM, supra note 1, at 2.
Jehl and Becker, supra note 174.
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was taken. 223 This makes restitution almost unworkable, as the
international law enforcement community cannot control the
illegal export of stolen artifacts unless told which artifacts have
actually been stolen. 224 Furthermore, many artifacts were
irreparably damaged or completely destroyed. 225 The Iraq
Museum itself was also damaged. 226 Doors were broken down
and display cases smashed. 227 The Iraq Museum is no more; its
collection is irreplaceable.
The emphasis on repatriation fails to take into account the
number of artifacts that will be destroyed in the actual looting,
let alone the destruction of the museum building and its
fixtures. Even when artifacts survive looting, recovery is not
easy. When professional art thieves with great knowledge of the
black market are involved, there is even less chance that pieces
will be recovered. There is also a general lack of understanding
about how difficult it is to track what has been stolen. Finally,
even after decades of repatriation efforts, thousands of artifacts
may still be missing. A museum can never fully recover after
being looted.
6.

The Failureof InternationalLaw

The protections for cultural artifacts supposedly guaranteed
by the Hague Convention failed to save the Iraq Museum when
it was threatened by looters. The United States, never a party
to the convention, invaded Iraq with complete disregard for the
protection of the Iraq Museum even though it had been duly
warned about the potential for looting. The defeated Iraqi
government, even if it had wanted to do so, was unable to
protect the museum. The international response came too late,
and only came when prompted by art experts and scholars.
Restitution efforts, as they always are, were unsuccessful when
examined against the number of pieces destroyed or
irretrievably lost. The devastating result of this failure of
international law was the loss of a large part of the record of
civilization, which will never be recovered. The next section will
discuss how such tragedies as the loss of the Iraq Museum may
be prevented.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Riding, supra note 212.
Id.
LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
Id.
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AN OUNCE OF PROTECTION IS WORTH A POUND OF

REPATRIATION

1. A Proposalfor GreaterProtectionof Museums duringArmed
Conflict
The previously discussed criticisms of current international
protections for cultural artifacts during wartime, especially
under the Hague Convention, suggest three main changes.
First, the protection of museums during periods of armed
conflict must be absolute. Second, the international community
must be proactive in coming to the aid of museums when war
threatens. Finally, efforts to protect cultural property should
focus on protecting cultural artifacts from damage and looting,
not repatriation of artifacts to destroyed museums after
hostilities have ceased. These three changes will go a long way
towards protecting cultural artifacts.
The first necessary change to current practices is to make
the protection of museums in wartime an absolute rule of
international law. A new multilateral convention is desperately
needed. The Hague Convention, written in 1954, is out of date.
At that time, the drafters could not have known how difficult
the post-World War II repatriation process would be. The
recent explosion of the Holocaust restitution movement, as well
as the current trend towards Western repatriation of artifacts
seized during various colonial eras, has shown the problems
attendant with a restitution-based, rather than a protectionbased system.
These developments also indicate a new
willingness on the part of the international community, even the
United States, to revisit current international law regarding the
protection of museums in times of war. The time is ripe for
UNESCO to lead the way in creating a new, workable
multilateral convention.
To maximize protections for museums, there also can no
longer be an exception for military necessity that allows the
destruction of cultural artifacts and the institutions in which
they are held. The lack of a military necessity exception
requires an additional protection, one that is already a part of
the Hague Convention. If the prohibition against attacking
museums is absolute, there must be a stringent condemnation of
using museums for military activities in times of war.
Otherwise, countries engaged in armed conflict could attempt to
forestall the destruction of their military operations by
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conducting such operations in museums. This would cause
greater risk to museums than is already present. If the
militarily necessitated destruction of museums and cultural
artifacts is to be completely disavowed, the prohibition against
using museums for wartime purposes must be strictly enforced.
To ensure the protection of museums during times of war,
there must also be a better international response when
museums are imperiled by armed conflict.
International
organizations, especially UNESCO, should continually apprise
themselves of possible armed conflicts that constitute a threat to
museums. Without waiting for a request from a country
preparing for war that may never come, these groups should
actively assist in safeguarding museums. This may include
removing some of the pieces for safekeeping, providing an armed
force capable of repelling looters, or working with a government
preparing for war to develop other plans for protecting
museums. Ultimately, swift and effective international action
will show that disregard for the safety of cultural artifacts in
times of war will not be tolerated.
Finally, and most importantly, there must be less emphasis
on repatriation of artifacts in multilateral conventions, and
more on protection of museums and their contents. A new
multilateral convention could include provisions requiring
invading countries to place cultural institutions on a no-target
list, to secure such institutions upon invasion along with
military and government buildings, and to maintain troops
outside of these institutions so long as there is a threat of
looting.
Although the Hague Convention did discuss pre-conflict
protection of artifacts, 228 the agreements since that time have
shifted the focus to post-conflict return of artifacts. 229
Furthermore, there is now a different kind of looting than was
contemplated in the post-World War II world of the Hague
Convention. In modern wars, looting is less likely to be done by
a supremely organized invading military than by hordes of
looters and some professional thieves. With thousands of
individuals looting, artifacts are even more likely to be lost
forever than when plunder was meticulously organized by an
invading country. A new UNESCO convention stressing the
importance of preventative protection of artifacts could be very

228.
229.

See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 153-164 and accompanying text.
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effective in addressing these new developments.
These three changes to the current international law
regarding cultural artifacts will ensure that cultural property
will actually be protected, not just recovered. The benefits of
these changes will be discussed more thoroughly in the next
section.
2. Reasons for GreaterProtectionof Museums duringArmed
Conflict
The reasons for creating better protections for museums go
well beyond a desire to save pretty pieces of artwork. Museums
are a source of national pride. When a country's cultural
heritage is destroyed or stolen, it is a major blow from which a
country may never recover. To add cultural loss to the already
demoralizing reality of military defeat is devastating.
Still, to say that the loss of a museum is a purely national
loss would be woefully inadequate. Each museum contains a
distinctive record of humanity, each adding to the
understanding of our world and its inhabitants. In failing to
take action to protect museums and by condoning exceptions for
military necessity, the international community sanctions this
self-destruction.
The most lamentable part of the current international law
regarding cultural artifacts is the preference for repatriation
over protection. Repatriation efforts take decades, and are
never entirely successful. Forgoing pre-conflict protections for
post-war repatriation automatically sacrifices artifacts.
Repatriation efforts can never recover all of the looted pieces,
nor can they reconstitute those that were destroyed.
3.

GreaterProtectionof Museums in Practice

In visualizing how better protections for museums in times
of war may work in practice, it may help to turn again to the
case of the Iraq Museum. If international legal safeguards for
the protection of cultural artifacts had prevented the looting of
the Iraq Museum, the United States' invasion might have led to
a very different scenario than the debacle it has become.
It may be argued that some of the ire felt by Iraqi citizens
towards the United States after the invasion can be attributed
to cultural insensitivity. Not the least of this was the U.S.
military's complete disregard for the safety of Iraqi antiquities
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held in the Iraq Museum and elsewhere. If the goal of the
United States in invading Iraq was actually to bring democracy
and freedom, protecting cultural institutions would have been a
Instead of allowing the
meaningful showing of goodwill.
destruction of Iraqi culture and history, the United States could
have made a point by keeping the Iraq Museum safe. A few
troops guarding the museum would have been enough to deter
looters.
Perhaps most importantly, a free and independent Iraq
with unharmed cultural institutions would have led to easier,
less painful rebuilding of the country after the United States'
invasion. Certainly, Iraq with its culture intact would be a very
different place. Military victors are already sufficiently reviled
by those whom they have conquered without aiding-whether
through action or inaction-the destruction of a conquered
country's culture. The United States would have saved itself a
great deal of trouble and expense afterwards had it attempted to
protect cultural institutions during its military invasion.
War is said to be waged to achieve peace. Peace would last
longer and be more successful if the wars creating it were not
culturally apocalyptic. The callous way in which the United
States achieved the invasion of Iraq does not portend a lasting
peace between the two nations.
CONCLUSION
If there is anything to be learned from the case of the Iraq
Museum, it is the amazingly short amount of time in which a
museum-and a culture-can be effectively destroyed by looters.
The extent of the damage and the shocking number of items lost
should serve as a warning to the international community.
Museums must be given greater protection during armed
conflict, if not for the sake of an individual country, then for our
shared history.

